OPEN THEISM

The debate on ‘Open Theism’ has not generated much interest in our churches. Like all theological subjects, however, what is discussed in the halls of academia usually trickle down to the local church in a surreptitious way. This is especially the case in the issue on Open Theism (henceforth “OpT”).

OpT is known by various names: “open theism”, “presentism”, “free-will theism” or simply, “openness theology”. Responses to OpT have been varied. On the one hand, one blurb on a pro-OpT book proclaims, “This book is an important act of courage and invites readers to new, courageous thinking.” Conversely, Thomas Oden writes that “the fantasy that God is ignorant of the future is a heresy that must be rejected on scriptural grounds.” I argue here for the latter proposition that OpT is a non-biblical position.

The orthodox Christian view (in other words, the traditional view), is described by Henry Thiessen as follows:

By the omniscience of God we mean that He knows Himself and all other things, whether they be actual or merely possible, whether they be past, present or future, and that He knows them perfectly and from all eternity. He knows things immediately, simultaneously, exhaustively and truly. He also knows the best ways to attain His desired ends.

For example, Isa 46:9-10 proclaims,

…for I am God, and there is no other;

I am God, and there is none like me,

declaring the end from the beginning

and from ancient times things not yet done,

saying, 'My counsel shall stand,

and I will accomplish all my purpose,' (ESV)

Christians traditionally take verses like these to mean two things: firstly, that God plans all that happens in history and is able to direct even future events to his desired ends. Secondly, God’s knowledge of the future is an essential element in the coming to pass all that is predicted in Scripture. We may say with Robert Strimple that “the entire broad historical stream of orthodox Christian faith has affirmed the comprehensive character of God’s foreknowledge … this has been the theism of Roman Catholicism (whether Augustinian, Thomistic, or Molinist), Eastern Orthodoxy, Lutheranism, Calvinism, and yes, Arminianism.”

OpT proponents, however, challenge the traditional reading on three grounds: philosophically, scripturally and subjectively. Philosophically, there is a renewed attempt to reconcile divine sovereignty with human freedom. Scripturally, one has to contend with the biblical passages where God seems to ‘repent’ or change his mind. On a subjective level, there seems to be a conflict between the existence of evil and the goodness of God.

The basic presupposition of the freewill theist is that since God has created man in God’s image, this image would include human participation in God’s creative activity as well. Man is seen primarily as functional rather than substantial i.e. man is what he does, not what he is. When speaking of the God-man relationship for example, John Sanders prefers the phrase ‘relational theism’ rather than OpT because relational theism is a “model of divine-human relationship that includes genuine give-and-take relations between God and human… In giveand-take relationships God receives and does not merely give.” (Italics are mine.)

A deeper analysis will reveal that the fundamental premise for OpT theologians is existential rather than theological. In other words, they are starting from their experience, not God’s word. Sanders, for example, was seeking to understand God’s purposes following the death of his brother (Christopher Hall and John Sanders, Does God Have a Future?: A Debate on Divine Providence, 12). Another major OpT theologian Gregory Boyd, admits that the cruelties done to a young Jewish girl by the Nazis was what led him to question traditional Christianity’s understanding of God’s foreknowledge. As such, OpT’s main thrust is to explain, or rather to explain away, how suffering can prevail in light of God’s love. So, William Tasker acknowledges that “the best Christian theodicy … will affirm forcefully that God the Creator and Redeemer is a risk taker.

Accordingly, God’s love requires for him to grant man ‘genuine’ freedom so man may choose either to obey or disobey. The Church has traditionally adopted a ‘compatibilistic’ view of this tension, to wit, there is no contradiction between God’s all-knowing character and human responsibility. OpT advocates see this stand as illogical. If for instance God knows what I’ll be doing tomorrow, then I would not really have a choice in the matter and therefore not truly ‘free’.

The open theist sees ‘true’ freedom in the libertarian sense. “Libertarianism” may be defined as the “view, opposed to determinism, that certain human actions are not (or not entirely) governed by necessitating causal laws”. What this means is that human choice is seen to be uncaused, even by God. Whilst God is omnipotent, he is not omnicausal.

Since God cannot (or will not) determine man’s freedom, he cannot necessarily know the future until ‘genuine’ decisions are made by man. Is this then a denial of God’s omniscience? OpT proponents say “no” because they believe that such ‘ignorance’ is self-imposed by God himself so that he may enter into a genuine relationship with his creatures. Furthermore, “omniscience” may be taken to mean the quality of knowing all that is logically possible to know – and this knowledge cannot include a future which has not yet happened.

Instead of the traditional understanding of providence wherein God knows in advance what is going to happen, OpT posits a world where God responds to the decisions of human actors. Just follow the thought of Sanders: “Moses’ refusal to return to Egypt prompted God to resort to plan B, allowing Aaron to do the public speaking instead of Moses.” Open theists envisage a God who is affected by our actions, and therefore he is joyful when we obey and grieves when we stray. Sanders goes so far as to say that God is the “defenceless superior power” who is vulnerable to man’s reactions.

Consistent with their view of God, the champions of OpT deny the exhaustiveness of predictive biblical prophecy. After all, how can God control what is in the future when alternative possibilities may occur? Richard Rice sees prophecy as an expression of God’s intention to assure believers that he is “still around”. Judas’ betrayal and Peter’s denial are not seen as a violation of their freedom but as God’s ability to make calculated guesses of the outcome because God has comprehensive knowledge of their mental states: God knows their probable actions. To be fair, though, Rice does concede that God sometimes interferes directly in bringing about fulfilment of prophecy (as in Cyrus’s decree in Isaiah in Isa 44:28).

How do we respond to the OpT? OpT begins with (1) God’s love which necessitates (2) a truly ‘free’ will which leads to (3) a limitation of God’s foreknowledge. Let’s consider this in turn:

Relationship with God

OpT hopes to explain the problem of evil by positing their version of a ‘kinder and gentler’ God. So, “God loves us and desires to enter into a reciprocal relationship of love with himself … God has granted us the freedom necessary for a truly personal relationship of love to develop.” (Hall and Sanders, 12). God’s supreme love is shown in his willingness to ‘take the risk’ that evil may result from man’s actions.

In this way, the OpT theorists reject both the main strands of Protestantism - Calvinism and Arminianism. John Calvin opines that “nothing happens but what he (i.e. God) has knowingly and willingly decreed.” But OpT theologian Clark Pinnock denies this: “the logic of consistent Calvinism makes God the author of evil and cast serious doubts on his goodness.” Richard Rice likewise criticises Arminianism: “Like Calvin, Arminius affirms God’s absolute foreknowledge, but unlike Calvin, he has no coherent explanation for it.”

Does this ‘new’ theodicy resolve the dilemma of evil? At a glance, it seems to have done so. But OpT fails at the wider level, which is: how will God be able to overcome evil ultimately when he cannot even coerce mankind’s actions? If we take Rice’s concession that God does occasionally intervene to bring things to pass, then Millard Erickson is right when he says that “the difference between their view and the classical one is not one of kind but of degree. It is not a matter of whether God coerces, but how frequently.”

Even more, a risk-taking God cannot be absolved from responsibility. Consider this: if God chose to limit himself, is he still not accountable for evil? In any case, given that God knows all possible scenarios, would he not know how bad the world would become, given man’s propensities (as in Genesis 6 for instance)? Would a God who takes such absurd risks still be good?

And then of course there is a problem of how we can conceive of God ‘limiting’ his own knowledge. It is a fundamental tenet of our faith that God is perfect, which means that none of his attributes can be stripped – he is “all in all”. In theological terms, God is “simple”, not comprised of compound parts.

Free will

According to Clark Pinnock for OpT, “God’s openness means that God is open to the changing realities of history, that God cares about and lets what we do impact him. Our lives make a difference to God – they are truly significant.”

So, it seems that our significance is dependent upon how God is affected by us. OpT’s libertarianism see mankind’s actions as uncaused – not by God, creation or even humanity’s own desires and dispositions. Thus, our choices in life are totally unpredictable and cannot be known in advance even by God himself: the most God can do is make an educated guess.

This reasoning however fails the Biblical test. Numerous passages attest to God’s foreplanning of the future activities of man (see for example, Prov 16:1,9; Eph 1:11; Rom 8:29-30; 11:36; Lam 3:37-8; Acts 17:28. etc.). Thus, Judas was doomed so that the “Scriptures would be fulfilled” (Acts 1:16) and Peter’s denial was prophesied in very specific terms (Matt 26:34).

Even on a purely philosophical level, it is incredible to think that anyone can act without a prior motive, disposition or cause. Iris Murdoch, the distinguished English novelist and philosopher argues that choice is continuous process. Indeed, “…we shall not be surprised that at crucial moments of choice most of the business of choosing is already over… the moral life, on this [Aristotelian] view, is something that goes on continually, not something that is switched off in between the occurrence of explicit moral choices.” Following Aquinas, a completely uncaused choice is impossible because everything in this world is dependent on cause and effect and hence, an uncaused will is inexplicable.

Ultimately, the traditional use of compatibilism is still the best explanation. Much of the objection to compatibilism lies in the assumption that ‘free will’ equals the restriction of God’s sovereignty. But compatibilism is actually linked to a form of voluntarism, which is taken to mean that “we do what we want to do, and that is why we are held accountable for what we do.” (D.A. Carson, How Long, O Lord?: Reflections on Suffering and Evil, 214). It is freedom from something so that we may have real choices. If that were not the case, how will we enjoy free will in heaven? Freedom is granted so that we may be led from being slaves of sin to obedience. Therefore scripture tells us that we have been set free from sin and have become slaves again, but this time to righteousness (Rom 6:18).

Is God’s Knowledge Exhaustive?

Typically the OpT is suspicious of this proposition. After all, did not God have to ask Adam where he was in the Garden of Eden? Didn’t God have to “come down” from heaven to see what was happening in Babel? As for his personal faculties, God sometimes ‘forgets’ (Ps. 9:18; 13:1); ‘remembers’ (Gen 9:15-6; Exo 6:5); is surprised (Jer 7:31) or even ‘repents’ (Gen 6:6; 18:16-33).

The difference between OpT and traditional Christianity lies in the hermeneutical approach taken. OpT as a rule discounts with an anthropomorphic reading of text like those above. They suggest the passages should be read metaphorically instead. Sanders provides an example of the metaphorical approach: “Just as the metaphors regarding God’s eyes or hand signify divine awareness and ability to act, so the metaphor of divine repentance informs us that God is responsive in his relations to us…”. So, all references to God’s character should be read in light of man’s condition, since we share in God’s image. As such, God’s control over us is likened to our human parents’ and so on – what is true for the creature is true for its Creator. In their ‘literal’ reading, when God says he is hurt, he hurts like a human being.

Is this the way one should read scripture? OpT has to contend with large amounts of scripture which stresses precisely this ‘otherness’ of God. In Rom 11:34 God asks “who has known the mind of the Lord?” (which is supposed to evoke a “no-one” response, by the way!). God is more emphatic in Psalm 50:21 when he says, “you thought I was altogether like you. But I will rebuke you and accuse you to your face.” One more example should be sufficient to drive the point home: “For my thoughts are not your thoughts, neither are your ways my ways” declares the LORD. As the heavens are higher than the earth, so are my ways higher than your ways and my thoughts than your thoughts.” (Isa 55:8-9).

Traditional theologians interpret the passages anthropomorphically – i.e. as God’s way of relating to us in a manner we can understand since God is ‘wholly Other’. The Bible, in short, is God’s speech to humans in human language. This is the difference according to Philip Johnson: “Their God can be wounded; His own creatures may afflict Him with anguish and woe, He is regularly frustrated when His plans are thwarted; and He is bitterly disappointed when His will is stymied – as it regularly is.”

In the end, OpT’s understanding of scripture and of God is seriously reductionistic in that they have failed to take the whole counsel of God into account and have a selective ‘proof-text’ theology. What the ‘involvement’ passages mean traditionally is that God is not impassive (unfeeling) but very much involved in our lives. What it does not imply is that our God has somehow been domesticated and made into our image. If God does not know our future, then the very character of God which is believed by the church for millennia has been a sham. The substance of scripture with its predictive assurances is undermined and one is bereft of any hope for future fulfilment. At the expense of so-called ‘love’, our faith and hope has been pulled out from under us and all that will be left is a god who can only wait in anticipation to see how everything will turn out, and whether evil will eventually be conquered.